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ABSTRACT
WebAuthn as part of FIDO2 is a new standard for two-factor and
even password-less user authentication to web-services. Leading
browsers, like Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, and Mozilla Fire-
fox, support the WebAuthn API. Unfortunately, the availability of
hardware authenticators that support FIDO2 authentication is still
focused heavily on desktop computers, while for mobile devices,
only a limited choice of suitable authenticators is available to users
(few roaming authenticators with wireless connectivity and even
fewer built-in platform authenticators on mobile devices). This cre-
ates a void for users, in particular users of older device generations
that lack platform authenticators and the right connectivity, to
authenticate themselves with WebAuthn to web-services.
In this poster, we present the idea of simFIDO, a FIDO2 setup
using a recently developed simTPM as (platform) authenticator for
mobile devices and even as roaming authenticator offered by mobile
devices to connected computers. The move-ability property of the
key storage of simTPM makes the users’ lives easier for credential
portability between devices. In particular, a seamless integration
of simTPM with non-mobile devices through phones will help to
create a kind of universal authentication setup using FIDO2.
Although we present the concrete design and implementation
of a SIM card-based FIDO2 authenticator, we hope this poster will
contribute to the discussion about how and in which form hardware
authenticators can be made available to users.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Multi-factor authentication; Hardware-
based security protocols; Usability in security and privacy.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The prevalence of text-based passwords [3] has recently been chal-
lenged by the introduction of FIDO2 [9], the successor to Universal
2nd Factor (U2F). FIDO2was jointly developed by the FIDOAlliance
and the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), and has since been
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adapted by all major browsers like Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge,
and Mozilla Firefox, as well as major websites such as Google ser-
vices, Windows Hello, Dropbox, GitHub, and others. With FIDO2,
users authenticate themselves with hardware authenticators in a
public-key cryptographic challenge-response protocol, either using
the authenticator as a second factor or even as a single factor. A cru-
cial question for the industry and research community is how such
hardware authenticators are made available to the end-users and in
which form to best cater for the end-user needs (e.g., no extra device to
carry and portability between client devices)? For instance, existing
authenticators are Security Keys, like YubiKey or Feitian; built-in se-
cure cryptoprocessors, like TPM or Titan M; or software solutions
based on trusted execution environments, like ARM TrustZone.
However, the FIDO2 specifications [9] do not restrict the authenti-
cator realization beyond the required capabilities, opening a chance
to explore different form-factors and integrations. In fact, NIST re-
cently called in a challenge [12] for a solution for a SIM card-based
secure element with FIDO2 authentication capability.
In this poster, we would like to add to the landscape of possible
FIDO2 authenticators and hope to engage into discussions about
how an "ideal" authenticator could look like and what challenges ex-
ist on the way to such a solution. Based on a recently published SIM
card-based TPM [4], we introduce simFIDO, a full stack implementa-
tion of FIDO2 for Android-based mobile devices using our simTPM
as hardware authenticator. Using the SIM card as authenticator
can offer intuitively many benefits, listed in the following, but also
needs thorough evaluation and discussion. We see, in particular,
the following benefits and capabilities of our solution:
• Integration with Google Strongbox: Providing a hardware-
backed isolated environment for Android’s Strongbox on devices
where a Titan M chip is not available.
• No extra device plus portability: By using the SIM card, we
piggy-back on the omnipresence of mobile devices and allow
easy migration of the authenticator to a new mobile device.
• User identification before password release: Using the ex-
tended authorization policies of TPM, our simTPM can be linked
with Android’s user authentication (e.g., password, PIN, pattern,
biometric) to implement user presence verification that only
allows authorized use of our authenticator.
• Platform and roaming authenticator: Using simTPM, a uni-
versal authenticator can be implementedwhere simTPMworks as
both platform authenticator to device-local apps and as roaming
authenticator to attached non-mobile devices through over-the-
air (bluetooth, NFC, etc.) or wired connections.
2 TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
We briefly introduce technical background information on FIDO2
and our simTPM.
2.1 FIDO2
FIDO2 is an open authentication standard that was jointly devel-
oped by the FIDO Alliance and the W3C, extending the previous
Universal 2nd Factor (U2F) standard. FIDO2 consists of two speci-
fications [9], WebAuthn [14] and CTAP2 [8]. WebAuthn provides
a standardized access for relying parties (e.g., a web-service) to
authenticate users via a hardware authenticator through a We-
bAuthn conforming client application, like the browser or an app.
The Client-To-Authenticator-Protocol (CTAP2) is used for com-
munication between a WebAuthn client application and a suitable
hardware authenticator. The authenticator can be either a roam-
ing authenticator, i.e., an external device connected via USB, NFC,
Bluetooth, etc., or a platform authenticator, i.e., built-in to the client
platform. Examples for roaming authenticators are Security Keys,
like YubiKey, or recently also Android phones in version 7+ [7].
Platform authenticators are, for instance, secure co-processors like
the Trusted Platform Modules (TPM) or Google’s Titan M chip.
While an explanation of the WebAuthn and CTAP protocols
is beyond the scope of this poster—we refer to excellent related
work [10]—it is noteworthy that FIDO2 provides significant security
benefits over the incumbent text-based passwords. This includes
removing shared secrets between client and relying party (like
passwords) that could be leaked through phishing, keyloggers, or
server-sided data leaks; reuse of the same authenticator is unlink-
able; and authentication sessions cannot be replayed.
The FIDO2 specifications demand that authenticators should
support different levels of user verification, i.e., use of the authenti-
cator has to be authorized and physical presence of the user should
be shown. This could be done through pressing a physical button
on the authenticator or local authorization to the authenticator via
PIN or biometrics (e.g., fingerprint).
Specifically on Android devices, the keystore system [1] that uses
the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) or, on newer devices with
Android version 9+ and necessary hardware support, the secure
element or Google’s Titan M chip, can act as a platform or roaming
authenticator and Android recently added corresponding APIs [2].
2.2 TPM and simTPM
The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is secure co-processor avail-
able on almost all desktop and server platforms today. Among the
different features it offers, the most relevant in this context are the
secure storage of cryptographic credentials, attesting the trusted
origin of TPM-generated credentials (key attestation), and enforc-
ing authorization policies on usage of such credentials. Recently,
Chakraborty et al. [4] presented the implementation of TPM as a se-
cure applet on a SIM card, called simTPM, providing aforementioned
capabilities of a TPM to an Android host device. Like a regular TPM,
the simTPM can be used as a FIDO2 authenticator.
The largest difference to a default TPM implementation and the
existing TEE-based or secure element based authenticators on An-
droid is simTPM’s movability between devices, allowing the user to
migrate their authentication keys easily to a new phone in contrast
to device-bound keys in built-in chips or TEE. By implementing the
authenticator in the SIM card, not only this movability is given, but
also other general user concerns with hardware authenticators are
addressed (c.f. [13]), such as the need and costs for an extra device.
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Figure 1: simTPM as platform authenticator for mobile de-
vices
As such, simTPM can add to the landscape of available FIDO2
authenticators and the next section explain howwe applied simTPM
in this context when building the simFIDO software stack. We
hope that by adding a new FIDO2 authenticator, we can encourage
further research about the design, deployment, and form factor
of hardware authenticators in order to cater for user needs and
proliferate adoption of FIDO2 authentication.
3 APPLICATION OF SIMTPM
Webriefly present the application of simTPM for FIDO2 user authen-
tication and how we integrated simTPM to this end into Android’s
software stack.
3.1 FIDO2 based authentication
Our simTPM provides a hardware token for FIDO2 authentication
(see Figure 1). Apps and browsers on the device that implement
WebAuthn can each call the simTPM via a new Android service
calledAndroid FIDO Service (AFS) to use the TPM as a regular FIDO2
authenticator. To ensure that only approved apps can make use of
the authenticator, we introduce a new Android permission and AFS
acts as enforcement point for incoming requests regarding this per-
mission. Only upon a successful permission check, it forwards the
request to the Android Radio Interface Layer (RIL) daemon, which
forwards messages between Android and the SIM card (see [4] for
details). Since a SIM card only understands Application Protocol
Data Unit (APDU ISO/IEC 7816-4) commands and since the TPM
applet of the SIM card only understands TPM commands within
those APDU that are according to the Trusted Computing Group
specification, but the incoming commands from the application are
in the form of CTAP commands, the custom RIL has to translate
between the different specifications. It converts the CTAP com-
mands into the corresponding TPM commands and then to APDU
commands and forwards them to simTPM. The response follows
the same path back to the application. This implementation will
use TPM as an internal authenticator and make the FIDO2 stack
available on the phone. Solving this technical challenge was the
fundamental step in making the simTPM available as authenticator
on the device.
3.2 User presence check and authorization
As mentioned before, FIDO2 requires authenticators to authorize
their use and verify user presence. The simTPM, like a regular
TPM chip, does not have a dedicated physical channel to the user
(e.g., a button as on YubiKeys). However, in the particular case of
simTPM on Android, we can overcome this limitation by linking
TPM’s extended authorization policies (EAP) with Android’s user
authenticationwithin the on-board Trusted Execution Environment.
EAP allows to restrict the usage of TPM-generated credentials by
enforcing different forms of authorization. This includes challenge-
response authentication with pre-determined TPM-external cre-
dentials. In our case, such an external credential is stored in the
Android TEE (keystore), where Android can enforce user presence
(e.g., fingerprint scan) for use of the TEE credentials. Thus, we
achieve indirect user presence verification and authorization via
the TEE: only if the user successfully authenticates to the TEE can
they correctly sign the response to the simTPM in an EAP session
to authorize the use of the simTPM-backed FIDO2 credential. EAP
is flexible enough to not impede the movability of the simTPM
between devices or to support simpler policies on devices with-
out a TEE and direct user authorization to the simTPM (e.g., PIN).
Since the policy for TPM-generated keys is included in the key
attestation by the TPM, which is necessary to establish trust into
FIDO2 authentication credentials by the relying party, the relying
party could even verify if a TPM-backed authentication credential
conforms with its security policy (e.g., mandatory user presence
verification via TEE).
3.3 Universal authenticator
Another interesting feature of simFIDO is its applicability as both
a platform and roaming authenticator. As explained in Section 3.1,
simFIDO makes the simTPM available as platform authenticator.
However, there are several ways to connect a mobile phone to
another platform, e.g., via Bluetooth, NFC or USB. This allows a
phone to expose the simTPM as a roaming authenticator to such
connected devices (see Figure 2). We introduced a new Android
system service External FIDO request receiver service (XFRR) that
exposes the phone to connected devices via CTAP as a roaming
authenticator and that is connected to the previously introduced
Android FIDO Service (AFS) to forward received CTAP commands
to the simTPM. This creates a setup where the simTPM serves as
a platform authenticator to apps on the mobile device as well as a
roaming authenticator to connected devices.
3.4 Google StrongBox integration
Lastly, Google recently introduced a new hardware security module
(Titan M) in Google Pixel 3 devices. It is equipped with it’s own
CPU, storage, TRNG, and additional tamper-proofing mechanisms.
It can provide a TPM-like secure storage and isolated co-processing.
To make use of it, Android added a new StrongBox keymaster API
that allows apps to store credentials in the new hardware security
module. Unfortunately, this chip is currently only available on very
limited Google products, making the rest of billions of devices
(specifically older devices) miss out on this strong protection. A
simTPM can retroactively bring this kind of service to any mobile
or non-mobile device that houses a SIM card circuit.
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Figure 2: simTPM as roaming authenticator for connected
non-mobile devices
4 CONCLUSION
simFIDO is a novel setup to provide FIDO2 user authentication
with a SIM card-based Trusted Platform Module. In this poster,
we present the design and realization of simFIDO on Android. By
adding the SIM card to the landscape of FIDO2 authenticators and
discussing it as a poster, we hope to encourage further research
on the design, deployment, and form-factors of FIDO2 authentica-
tors: while a simTPM offers appealing benefits, such as movability
between devices, availability on mobile devices and as roaming
authenticator on connected devices, and no need for extra devices,
many other questions and user concerns remain open. For instance,
accessibility of the authenticator [6, 11], recovery [5, 13], or avail-
ability [11].
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